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Aesthetic experience and spiritual well-being: locating the role of theological commitments 
 
Mark Wynn 
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds 
Email: M.Wynn@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Religious traditions are typically concerned not ŽŶůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĂĚŚĞƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŵŽƌĂůĂŶĚĐƌĞĞĚĂů
commitments, but also their lives considered in aesthetic terms. This aesthetic interest is apparent 
in, for instance, traditions of architecture, music, poetry and painting, and in the bodily disciplines 
associated with worship and other devotional practices. Given these traditions, it is natural to 
suppose that aesthetic experience is in some way important for spiritual well-being, and in turn for 
the lived practice of religion, and in this paper, I consider how that might be so. 
In the course of the paper, I shall discuss three accounts of the spiritual significance of aesthetic 
experience. Two of these perspectives I have taken from the recent literature in theological 
aesthetics, and the third I shall construĐƚ ?ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶdŚŽŵĂƐƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƐŽĨ
the infused moral virtues. This broadly Thomistic approach occupies, I shall argue, a middle ground 
between the other two, on account of its distinctive understanding of the role of theological context 
in defining spiritually significant goods. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but they do 
present rather different conceptions of the ways in which aesthetic goods can contribute to spiritual 
well-being, and provide a focus for religious practice. 
/ďĞŐŝŶďǇƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚdŚŽŵĂƐƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨƵƐĞĚŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ?/ƐŚĂůů
then argue that this framework can be applied not only to moral goods, as Aquinas proposes, but 
also to spiritually significant aesthetic goods. 
1. Thomas Aquinas on the infused moral virtues 
ƋƵŝŶĂƐǁĂƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌďŽƚŚǁŝƚŚƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?ŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐƚĞŵƉĞƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨƵƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐŽĨ
faith, hope and charity.1 He affirms both traditions and, characteristically, he also seeks to integrate 
                                                          
1 dŚĞ ‘ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?ŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŚĂďŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ
Nicomachean Ethics, Book II. For instance, I can acquire the virtue of courage by repeatedly doing 
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them  W in this case, by introducing a novel category, that of infused moral virtue.2 To see how 
ƋƵŝŶĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŚŝƐĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐďƌŝĞĨůǇŶŽƚĞƚǁŽƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƐ from the Summa Theologiae. In 
these texts, Thomas is concerned, in turn, with the relationship of the infused moral virtues to the 
theological virtues, and with the connection between the infused moral virtues and the acquired or 
Aristotelian virtues. When first introducing the notion of infused moral virtue, he writes: 
The theological virtues are enough to shape us to our supernatural end as a start, that is, to 
God himself immediately and to none other. Yet the soul needs also to be equipped by 
infused virtues in regard to created things, though as subordinate to God.3 
On this account, the infused moral virtues share their teleology with the theological virtues, as God-
directed, but differ in their subject matter  W since the infused moral virtues are concerned, in the 
ĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ
theological virtues are concerned directly, or immediately, with relationship to God. We can see, 
more exactly, why Aquinas finds the infused moral virtues of spiritual significance if we consider his 
account of their relationship to the acquired moral virtues. In the following passage, he is concerned, 
in particular, with the distinction between infused temperance and temperance as conceived by 
Aristotle, but it is clear that he intends this account to be generalisable to other infused moral 
virtues and their acquired counterparts. He comments: 
It is evident the measure of desires appointed by a rule of human reason is different from 
that appointed by a divine rule. For instance, in eating, the measure fixed by human reason 
is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason; whereas 
[the] divine rule requires that a man should chastise his body and bring it into subjection [1 
Cor 9:27], by abstinence in food, drink and the like.4 
Here, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of good. There is, first of all, the kind that is realised 
ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŚƵŵĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?dŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĞxample that 
Aquinas gives here, I can secure the good of bodily health in so far as my dietary habits are 
appropriate for a creature of my kind: one set of dietary habits of will be appropriate for me, 
                                                          
the courageous thing in situations of danger. The theological virtues, by contrast, depend directly on 
ƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇŽĨ'ŽĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ‘ŝŶĨƵƐĞĚ ? ? 
2 &ŽƌĂŚĞůƉĨƵůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŝƌƚƵĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĨŚŝƐ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨŽƌĞďĞĂƌƐ ?ƐĞĞ:ŽŚŶ/ŶŐůŝƐ ? ‘ƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐZĞƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƋƵŝƌĞĚDŽƌĂů
sŝƌƚƵĞƐ ? ?The Journal of Religious Ethics, 27 (1999), pp. 3-27. 
3 Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. 63. 3 ad. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, I am following the Blackfriars 
translation of the Summa Theologiae, ed. Thomas Gilby (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-74). 
4 ST 1a2ae. 63. 4. 
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considered as a human being, and another for members of other species, and I realise the good that 
is the object of acquired temperance so far as my life is ordered by the first set of habits. But my 
habits of eating and drinking are also capable of realising another kind of good, where it is some 
theological truth, rather than my human nature, which provides the standard for the 
appropriateness of my practice. Given its original literary context, it is clear that in the passage from 
1 Corinthians that Aquinas cites here, Paul is concerned with the goal of sharing in the life of God in 
eternity ?ŶĚƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŝƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵƉĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?
end of human beings, in the beatific vision, can provide a measure for human thought and conduct 
in the present, since our thought and conduct in the present can be assessed as more or less 
appropriate relative to this truth concerning our eschatological future.5 
It follows from this account that the infused moral virtues are targeted at a distinctive kind of good  W 
not goods of the kind that are relative simply to our human nature, nor God-directed goods that 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ'ŽĚ ?ďƵƚŐŽŽĚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
material order, in so far as that relation proves to be fitting relative to our theological context. So the 
goods of the infused moral virtues have a hybrid character: they are world-directed  W in this respect, 
they resemble the goods of the Aristotelian virtues  W ĂŶĚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ‘ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŽ'ŽĚ ? ?
since they are concerneĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚ-directed activity and their 
relationship to God  W and in this respect, they are like the theological virtues. In this way, the infused 
moral virtues serve as a kind of hinge, bringing together the Aristotelian virtues, whose subject 
matter they share, and the theological virtues, with which they share their teleology. So these 
virtues, and the hybrid goods at which they aim, have a special part to play in the spiritual life, by 
ensuring that world-directed forms of thought and activity can be integrated into relationship to 
God. 
We might wonder what makes a given world-ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚŵŽĚĞŽĨůŝĨĞ ‘ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ
ƚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĨƵƐĞĚƚĞŵƉĞƌĂŶĐĞŵŝŐŚƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ that the 
relevant relation is, broadly speaking, causal. In the passage from 1 Corinthians that Aquinas cites, 
Paul is developing an analogy between bodily and spiritual discipline, and we might infer that just as 
a regime of physical training can be deemed more or less appropriate according to whether it 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƐƚŚĞĂƚŚůĞƚĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞŐĂŵĞƐ ?ƐŽĚŝĞƚĂƌǇĂďƐƚŝŶĞŶĐĞĐĂŶďĞũƵĚŐĞĚŵŽƌĞ
                                                          
5 The text reads: 25Everyone who competes in the games goes into strict training. They do it to get a 
crown that will not last, but we do it to get a crown that will last forever. 26Therefore I do not run 
like someone running aimlessly; I do not fight like a boxer beating the air. 27No, I strike a blow to my 
body and make it my slave [chastise my body and bring it into subjection] so that after I have 
preached to others, I myself will not be disqualified for the prize. (New International Version) 
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ŽƌůĞƐƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞƐƉŝƌŝƚƵĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĂƚƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ
a  ‘ĐƌŽǁŶƚŚĂƚǁŝůůůĂƐƚĨŽƌĞǀĞƌ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶǀŝƚĞĂƌĂƚŚĞƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
reading of the relationship between spiritual practices and the goods of the spiritual life. Let us take 
an example of this second kind. 
While Aquinas does not classify it as an infused moral virtue, neighbour love is at least a closely 
related case, since it is directed to the world (specifically, it concerns our relations to rational 
creatures) and at the same time ordered to relationship to God.6 In the following passage, Thomas is 
discussing the appropriateness of love for the angels. This might appear to be a somewhat arcane 
question, but the case he makes here is representative of what he says more generally about the 
grounds of neighbour love, so has a wider significance. He writes: 
the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which 
ŵĞŶƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŶŐĞůƐ ?&ŽƌŝƚŝƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ?Dƚ ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ
 ?ŵĞŶƐŚĂůůďĞĂƐƚŚĞĂŶŐĞůƐŽĨ'ŽĚŝŶŚĞĂǀĞŶ ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉŽĨ
charity extends also to the angels.7 
Here, Aquinas grounds the appropriateness of love for the angels in the truth that they will one day 
share with human beings in the beatific vision. So on this account, neighbour love proves to be 
fitting not because of its causal efficacy in bringing about a spiritually valuable state of affairs (such 
as the vision of God), but as a response to an already established truth concerning our eschatological 
future. We could record this point by saying that the appropriateness of neighbour love is more 
existential than causal. In the immediately following article, Aquinas notes that love of sinners is 
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ P ‘/ŶƚŚŝƐůŝĨĞ ?ŵĞŶǁŚŽĂƌĞŝŶƐŝŶƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ of obtaining everlasting 
ŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?8 Here too, the fittingness of neighbour love appears to be existential rather than causal  W 
only the appropriateness of the relevant practices is now anchored not in the idea that we will one 
day share with other human beings in the beatific vision, but in the thought that we may do so. I 
shall not explore further why this relation of existential congruence should obtain in such cases, but 
a rough analogy would be provided by the case where my past friendship with a person, especially if 
that friendship ran deep, is taken to set certain constraints on how I am to treat the person in the 
                                                          
6 /ŚĂǀĞŶŽƚŵĂĚĞŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĨƵƐĞĚ ?Đharacter of the infused moral virtues, that is, their status as directly 
God-given, rather than as produced by way of some process of habituation, but it is also true that neighbour 
love shares the aetiology of the infused moral virtues. See ST 2a2ae. 24. 2, where Aquinas is discussing 
whether love of God is infused, and ST  ?Ă ?ĂĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂĐƚ
ǁŚĞƌĞďǇǁĞůŽǀĞ'ŽĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞďǇǁĞůŽǀĞŽƵƌŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĞŶǌŝŐĞƌƌŽƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŚĞƌĞ P
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html, accessed 28 January 2017. 
7 ST 2a2ae. 25. 10 ?,ĞƌĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?/ĂŵĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶǌŝŐĞƌƌŽƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ?ŚĂƌŝƚǇŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ĐĂƌŝƚĂƐ ? ?
or what I am calling neighbour love. 
8 ST 2a2ae. 25. 11 ad. 2, Benziger translation. 
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present, even if our friendship has now lapsed. Aquinas seems to be dealing with the future-
directed, eschatological, counterpart of this sort of case. 
/ŶƐƵŵ ?ƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨƵƐĞĚŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌůŽǀĞ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŚƵŵĂŶ
beings can realise various hybrid goods in their relations to the created world, providing that those 
relations are congruent with their theological context  W and congruence or appropriateness in this 
context can be understood, I have been suggesting, in existential or in causal terms. Of course, in the 
texts we have been discussing, Aquinas is concerned with, broadly speaking, moral goods  W goods 
that arise in so far as we treat other human beings, and our own bodies, appropriately. Next, I want 
to consider whether this framework can be extended to the case of aesthetic goods. If that can be 
done, then we will have a way of representing the contribution of aesthetic, as well as moral, goods 
to the spiritual life. 
2. Extending Aquinas ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨďŽĚŝůǇĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ 
It is of course a requirement of neighbour love that, in relevant circumstances, I should act 
beneficently towards other human beings  W and doing that will require, in the normal case, that I 
move my body appropriately. For example, if someone is thirsty, then I may be required to extend 
ƚŚĞŵĂĐƵƉŽĨǁĂƚĞƌ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŝĨǁĞĨŽůůŽǁƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶt of the rationale for neighbour love, 
then we should say that, in the requisite interpersonal setting, the movements of my body can be 
assessed as more or less appropriate relative to theological context. In this sort of case, the 
requirements of neighbour love seem to be moral in character: if it is true that I will one day share 
with others in the beatific vision (or if it is simply possible that I will do so), then I am required to 
treat them beneficently, and in general with moral respect, here and now. But religious traditions 
also display another kind of interest in the movements of the body, one that is not simply, if at all, a 
question of the moral appropriateness of those movements. Think, for instance, of the 
iconographical conventions governing the representation of individuals of acknowledged sanctity, 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƵĚĚŚĂŽƌŚƌŝƐƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐƚŽƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
facial expressions and comportment. Here, the focus is not evidently on the moral efficacy of the 
ďŽĚǇ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐďŽĚǇ ?ŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞ ?ŝƐ
taken to signify their transparency to a divine or sacred order, rather than, directly, the quality of 
their moral or inter-personal relations. 
ŽƚƚŝĐĞůůŝ ?ƐĞƐtello annunciation provides a helpful example of this wider phenomenon. In this 
ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨůĞǆŝŽŶƐŽĨDĂƌǇ ?ƐďŽĚǇĂƌĞĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ
6 
 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŐĞů ?ƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?9 And to the extent that the disposition of her body is 
indeed appropriate relative to this particular theological context, then her response will realise a 
good of the same structure as the goods of the infused moral virtues as Aquinas conceives them. But 
in this case, the relevant good is not evidently mŽƌĂů ?ŽƌĨŽƌƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌĐĂƵƐĂů PDĂƌǇ ?ƐďŽĚŝůǇ
demeanour is not a response to the presence of any human being, nor is she trying to effect any 
change in her environment, whether of a morally significant or other kind. Instead, the disposition of 
her body rĞǀĞĂůƐŚĞƌĂƚƚƵŶĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƚŚĂƚŝƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂŶŐĞů ?ƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?
and is fitting on these existential grounds. 
The examples I have cited so far  W of depictions of figures such as Christ, the Buddha, or Mary  W may 
suggest that this kind of interest in the disposition of the body extends only to spiritually remarkable 
individuals, or has relevance only in rather specialised contexts. But it is not difficult to find further 
examples, where the bodily demeanour of ordinary people, in unexceptional circumstances, is 
assigned the same kind of significance. Hence C.S. Lewis can write in these terms of the role of bodily 
demeanour in disclosing the  ‘ŶĞǁ ?ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŽĨŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶƐ P ‘dŚĞŝƌǀĞƌǇǀŽŝĐĞƐĂŶĚĨĂĐĞƐ ƌĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
from ours; stronger, ƋƵŝĞƚĞƌ ?ŚĂƉƉŝĞƌ ?ŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĂŶƚ ? ?10 And while he does not address the point 
directly, it seems clear that Lewis takes this transformation in the bodily appearance of Christians to 
be appropriate not as a means to effecting some change in the world, but because this is a way of 
registering in bodily terms the sense of the Christian theological narrative: if a person subscribes to 
that narrative, then it is only right that they should greet the world, in bodily terms, in this spirit of 
quiet radiance. 
Similarly ?ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƐůŽǁƐƚĞƉŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽƵĚŵĂŶ ?ĂĚĞĞƉ
ǀŽŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůĞǀĞůƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?11 Here the focus is upon an interpersonal rather than theological 
context, but in this case too, a certain bodily demeanour is taken to be appropriate not because it is 
apt to bring about good outcomes, but as a way of registering the significance of the relevant 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ PƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚƐŽƵůĞĚ ?ŵĂŶŝƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŚŝƐĐŽŵƉŽƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?
he enacts this truth about his capacity to manage his affairs on his own terms, and free from 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?KƌĂŐĂŝŶ ?ZĂŝŵŽŶĚ'ĂŝƚĂŚĂƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ ?ŽĨĂŶƵŶŝŶŚĞƌ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐŽŶĂƉƐǇĐŚŝĂƚƌŝĐǁĂƌĚ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐďǇƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŚĞƐƉŽŬĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ŚĞƌ
fĂĐŝĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨůĞǆŝŽŶƐŽĨŚĞƌďŽĚǇ ? ?12 KŶ'ĂŝƚĂ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨůĞǆŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŶƵŶ ?ƐďŽĚǇ
                                                          
9 For an illustration of the painting, see https://www.virtualuffizi.com/the-cestello-annunciation-by-sandro-
botticelli.html, accessed 20 April 2017. 
10 C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Glasgow: William Collins, Sons & Co., 1944), p. 186. 
11 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, tr. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), Book IV, Section III. 
12 Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice (Melbourne: Text 
WƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?'ĂŝƚĂĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŶƵŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůůŽǀĞŽĨƐĂŝŶƚƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚǁĞ
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ŚĂǀĞĂŵŽƌĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ?ŝŶĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐŽƵƌ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚŚĞƌĞĂŐĂŝŶŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ
of the body themselves, and what they signify, rather than their capacity to bring about good 
outcomes, that is the focus of interest.13 
^ƵƉƉŽƐĞǁĞŵĂƌŬƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďǇƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚŽĨ ‘ďŽĚŝůǇĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ ?ĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞ
ŽƚŚĞƌŽĨ ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ ?ŝƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉriateness of a 
disposition of the body is understood in existential rather than causal terms. So far, we have been 
considering the idea that demeanour, in this sense, and not only behaviour, is capable of realising a 
hybrid good of the kind that Aquinas associates with the infused moral virtues. But we have not yet 
addressed the question of why we might suppose such goods to have an aesthetic dimension. I am 
not suggesting that in every case where bodily demeanour is appropriate relative to theological 
context, the resulting good will be, at least in part, aesthetic. But it seems that aesthetic values will 
be importantly involved in some central instances of such goods. For instance, in the Cestello 
ĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨůĞǆŝŽŶƐŽĨDĂƌǇ ?ƐďŽĚǇĂƌĞƐƵƌĞůǇƐƵƉƉosed to be appropriate at least in part 
because they constitute a graceful acknowledgement of the theological context that is revealed in 
ƚŚĞĂŶŐĞů ?ƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ŶĚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚŽĨĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ
iconographical traditions, to the extent that the figures they depict can be deemed dignified or 
ŐƌĂĐĞĨƵůĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶƉĂƌƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚƵŶĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŽƌƐƉŝƌŝƚƵĂů
context. So let us allow that in central cases, even if not universally, hybrid goods will have an 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ƐĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
relevant theological context. 
It is worth distinguishing this understanding of the contribution of aesthetic goods to the spiritual 
life from one that haƐďĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ǁŝŶďƵƌŶĞ ?^ƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞ ? ?
ĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?^ǁŝŶďƵƌŶĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ P ‘/ĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ'ŽĚ ?ƐƵĐŚƚĂƐŬƐǁŝůůŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇďĞǀĂƐƚůǇ
more worthwhile than secular tasks  W for there will be a depth of contemplation of the richness of 
life of a person, God, open to us which would not be open if there is no omnipotent and omniscient 
ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?14 KŶƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ďĞĂƵƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞ ?ǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
significance if there is a God, because it will then be, in some way, relevant to the contemplation of 
                                                          
might reasonably suppose that he regards her conduct as a paradigm of neighbour love. Perhaps, then, the 
concept of neighbour love implies not only certain behavioural tendencies, of the kind that we have noted, but 
also an appropriate bodily demeanour. 
13 We might be inclined to say that Gaita takes the bodily demeanour of the nun to be appropriate as an 
acknowledgement of the moral status of the patients. But that way of putting the matter would not be faithful 
to the strand of his thought which represents this sort of response as, at least in part, constitutive of the 
 ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ŽĨŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇĂƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚ ? 
14 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ǁŝŶďƵƌŶĞ ?dŚĞŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ^ĐŚĞŵĞŽĨ^ĂůǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶDŝĐŚĂĞůZĞĂ ?ĞĚ ? ?Oxford Readings in Philosophical 
Theology: Volume 1, Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 305. 
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'ŽĚ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?^ǁŝŶďƵƌŶĞŶŽƚĞƐŚŽǁ ‘ĂƌƚŝƐƚŝĐĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ǁŝůůďĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŽƌǇŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ'ŽĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
in that case we will owe God, as our benefactor, a life that is productive in aesthetic and other 
terms.15 And if that is so, then artistic work will also acquire an additional significance if there is a 
God, because it will then fulfil an obligation  W and a particularly weighty obligation, namely, one that 
is owed to God.16 
In each of these cases, an activity which is anyway aesthetically significant, independently of 
reference to any theological context, comes to bear a further dimension of significance if we 
introduce a theological context. But the additional goodness that attaches to these activities if there 
is a God is not itself aesthetic. For instance, in the second of the examples I have taken from 
Swinburne, the additional goodness that attaches to artistic activity if there is a God turns out to be 
moral rather than aesthetic in character  W since this activity is additionally good by virtue of fulfilling 
a moral debt that is owed to God. By contrast, the case we have been considering concerns an 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐŐŽŽĚ ?/ŶŽƚƚŝĐĞůůŝ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?DĂƌǇ ?ƐĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌĐĂŶ ?ŶŽĚŽƵďƚ ? be seen as 
graceful from a purely secular vantage point; but once we have introduced the relevant theological 
context, then her demeanour will count as graceful for a further reason, because it will then count as 
graceful as a response to that context. So with Swinburne, we have noted how aesthetic goods may 
be integral to the spiritual life, but by contrast with his account, we have been concerned with the 
case of theologically grounded aesthetic goods, namely, goods whose aesthetic dimension consists 
at ůĞĂƐƚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚƵŶĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? 
/ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨƵƐĞĚŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐŵĂǇďĞ
extended, so that it applies to aesthetic as well as moral goods. Next, I want to touch on two further 
accounts of the contribution of aesthetic goods to the spiritual life. We will then be in a position to 
compare these accounts with the perspective we have derived from Aquinas. 
3. Two further approaches to the nature of spiritually significant aesthetic goods 
In the following passage, Jeremy Begbie is discussing the figure of Christ on the cross, and 
considering how even such a figure can be considered as beautiful: 
ŝŶĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?ĐƌƵĐŝĨŝǆŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞĂƚŚ ?'ŽĚ ?Ɛůove is displayed at its 
ŵŽƐƚƉŽƚĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ĨŽƌŵ ?ŽĨďĞĂƵƚǇŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞƌĂĚŝĂŶƚ ?ƐƉůĞŶĚŝĚĨŽƌŵŽĨ'ŽĚ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-giving love. 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p. 305. 
16 ^ǁŝŶďƵƌŶĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ PƚŚŝƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?
objective. See ibid., p. 295. 
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ƐĂƌĚŝŶĂůZĂƚǌŝŶŐĞƌ ?ƉƵƚŝƚ P ‘ŝŶŚŝƐ&ĂĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƐŽĚŝƐĨŝŐƵƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?
extreme beauty: the beauty of love that gŽĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĚ ? ?17 
On this account, despite being twisted and distorted, the face of the crucified Christ can be 
considered beautiful. Indeed, it can be reckoned beautiful precisely in its twistedness, in so far as it is 
in his disfigured appearance that ChƌŝƐƚ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-sacrificial love is revealed. Here, the notion of beauty is 
being moralised: even if a body is by conventional aesthetic standards an object of horror rather 
than aesthetic attraction, it can still be termed beautiful, if it discloses the beauty of an edifying 
ŵŽƌĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ZĂƚǌŝŶŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚƵƌŶĞŐďŝĞ ?Ɛ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŚƌŝƐƚ ?ƐůŝĨĞ
does not simply illustrate the nature of true love, and therefore of  ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ? moral beauty, but 
serves as the paradigm of such love, by providing the standard against which other examples are to 
ďĞũƵĚŐĞĚ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ĞŐďŝĞǁƌŝƚĞƐĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨ:ĂŵĞƐDĂĐDŝůůĂŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬTriduum, 
which is concerned of course with the events of Easter morning: 
dŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚŝŶSymphony: Vigil neither effaces the harshness of the memories 
ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐĚĂǇƐŶŽƌĂĐĐŽƌĚƐƚŚĞŵĂŶǇŬŝŶĚŽĨƵůƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?/ƚƐďĞĂƵƚǇŝƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐďƵƚƚŝĚǇ ?
the forms overlap, material is scattered, dropƉĞĚĂŶĚƉŝĐŬĞĚƵƉĂŐĂŝŶ ?18 
KŶĞŐďŝĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?DĂĐDŝůůĂŶ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƐƚŽĂdistinctively Christological aesthetic ideal, by 
ŵŝƌƌŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĂŐŐĞĚ ? ‘ƵŶƚŝĚǇ ?ŬŝŶĚŽĨďĞĂƵƚǇƚŚĂƚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞEĞǁdĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚnarrative of 
:ĞƐƵƐ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚĂŶĚƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?So here again, we are concerned with a moral ideal of beauty, which 
is realised primordially in the Jesus story  W only here that beauty is rendered in musical rather than 
visual form. 
This is one conception of the spiritual significance of beauty to set alongside the Thomistically 
ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŶŽǁŽŶĞĨŝŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
these matters. In the following text, George Pattison is discussing a video installation which was 
located for a time next to the baptismal font of Durham Cathedral. The video depicts a naked man 
who sinks down through a body of shimmering water, until lost from view, before returning 
gradually to the surface, so that his form comes slowly into focus once again. This cycle lasts about 
thirty minutes, and is then repeated. The artist, Bill Viola, produced the recording for this site, but 
did not intend his work to bear any specifically Christian doctrinal meaning. Pattison comments: 
Although Viola himself is informed more by Buddhist than by Christian spirituality, the work 
projects itself almost effortlessly towards Christian appropriation precisely because of its use 
                                                          
17 :ĞƌĞŵǇĞŐďŝĞ ? ‘ĞĂƵƚǇ ?^ĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌƚƐ ? ?ŝŶ dƌĞŝĞƌ ?D ?,ƵƐďĂŶĚƐ ?ĂŶĚZ ?>ƵŶĚŝŶ ?ĞĚƐ), The 
Beauty of God: Theology and the Arts, Downers Grove, ILL: IVP Academic, 2006, p. 63. 
18 Ibid., p. 68. 
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of a language before language that is the primary matrix of symbolic formation and that is 
shared by Christian and non-Christian art alike.19 
In the book from which this excerpt is taken, Pattison defends the familiar view that to apprehend 
the aesthetic significance of a work of art, we should appreciate the work simply for itself, by 
attending to its sensory qualities, and bracketing out any theological or other interpretive frame.20 
When we approach the work in this mode, we are reliant upon what he calls in this passage, 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŚĞŚĂƐďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĐƵůƉƚŽƌŶƚŽŶǇ'ŽƌŵůĞǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞďĞĨŽƌĞ
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?/ƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?Ɛ non-verbal, pre-discursive responses that we apprehend the 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƉƌŝŵŽƌĚŝĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞďŽĚŝůǇŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶ
sinking through the water and then returning to the surface, elicits in the viewer thoughts of 
drowning, death and rebirth, and perhaps also of cleansing, independently of reference to any 
culturally specific interpretive lens. In these ways, according to Pattison, works of art can sensitise us 
to the universal, bodily significance of water and the other elemental constituents of the sensory 
world. 
But for Pattison, there can then be ĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƚĞƉŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝƐ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĚ ?
using the categories of a particular cultural or religious tradition. Hence ǁĞĐĂŶĂůƐŽƌĞĂĚsŝŽůĂ ?Ɛ
work in terms of specifically Christian categories, and ǁĂƚĞƌ ?Ɛsignificance in the Christian rite of 
ďĂƉƚŝƐŵ ?ĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƉŝƌŝƚƵĂůĐůĞĂŶƐŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞďŝƌƚŚ ?WĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
power of a work for a given religious tradition is revealed when this second phase of interpretation 
can build constructively upon the first. So when it is apprehended in terms of the language before 
language of the body, sŝŽůĂ ?Ɛ video discloses the elemental significance of water for creatures such 
as ourselves; and its specifically Christian import is then revealed when this primordial significance is 
further elaborated using the categories of the Christian narrative of baptism. It is the fit between 
these two readings of the video, the pre-discusive and the doctrinally articulated, that establishes 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƐŝƚƚŽƐƉĞĂŬ ?ĂƐWĂƚƚŝƐŽŶƐĂǇƐ ? ‘ĂůŵŽƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚůĞƐƐůǇ ?ŝŶƚŽĂ
specifically Christian cultural context. So on this account, aesthetic goods have a part to play in the 
religious life by grounding spiritual values  W such as the ideal of spiritual cleansing or rebirth  W in the 
life of the body, and its primordial sensitivity to the sensory world.  
4. Aesthetic goods and spiritual well-being 
                                                          
19 George Pattison, Art Modernity and Faith (London: SCM, 1998), p. 185. 
20 &ŽƌĂŚĞůƉĨƵůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐ ?ƐĞĞEŝĐŚŽůĂƐtŽůƚĞƌƐƚŽƌĨĨ ? ‘ƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ PdŚĞZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶW ?<ŝǀǇ ?ĞĚ ? ? ?The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), Ch. 18. 
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We have been sketching three conceptions of the contribution of the arts or, more broadly, of 
aesthetic values to the spiritual life  W those of Begbie, Pattison, and the Thomistically informed 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞĞǆƉŽƵŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŽƚƚŝĐĞůůŝ ?Ɛestello annunciation. As we have 
seen, these accounts are all concerned with the spiritual, and aesthetic, significance of the human 
body, but they differ in their understanding of the relationship between aesthetic and theological 
values. 
ĞŐďŝĞ ?Ɛperspective and the approach we have been exploring by reference to Aquinas are alike in 
identifying a kind of bodily beauty that is evident only from the vantage point of the relevant 
ƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞ ?KŶĞŐďŝĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĨƌĂŵĞŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ Christ, which 
generates a distinctively theological measure of aesthetic value, which in turn makes it possible to 
find beauty even in a twisted and distorted body, in so far as it is relevantly Christ-like. Here, the 
introduction of a theological frame involves the substitution of a theological measure of aesthetic 
excellence for more conventional measures, which would yield a very different verdict in this case. 
The Thomistic account we have been considering differs on this point, since it adopts a conventional 
construal of categories such as gracefulness. In this case, the theological frame does not displace our 
established measures of aesthetic value, but introduces an expanded context within which those 
measures may be deployed. Hence, in the Cestello ĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?DĂƌǇ ?ƐďŽĚŝůǇĚĞŵĞĂŶŽƵƌ ?ǁŚich 
can be recognised as graceful from a secular point of view, proves to be graceful in a further respect 
once it is located within the relevant theological context. Here the theological frame deepens the 
aesthetic ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚĂŶǇǁĂǇďĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĞŐďŝĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ
frame overturns the aesthetic judgement that we would otherwise make. 
tŚŝůĞĞŐďŝĞƐƚĂƌƚƐĨƌŽŵĂƚŚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞ ?WĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐǀĂůƵĞŝŶǀŝƚĞƐƵƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
first instance, to set aside theological and other interpretive categories, and to consider the artwork 
simply by reference to its import for the body. We might see this procedure as somewhat 
ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨƋƵŝŶĂƐ ?ƐĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? in his account of the goods of the 
acquired moral virtues: here, we are concerned with the artwork on the basis simply of our 
humanity, and independently of any culturally specific frame of reference. However, Pattison is 
interested in an assessment of the work that is at first simply bodily in character, rather than being 
ordered in discursive or conceptual terms, and in this respect the two approaches evidently differ. 
KŶWĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ŽŶĐĞǁĞŚĂǀĞĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?ǁĞĐĂŶƚŚĞŶ ?ĂƐĂƐĞĐŽŶĚ
interpretive step, introduce a theological frame of reference. And this move may sound rather like 
dŚŽŵĂƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝŶĨƵƐĞĚŵŽƌĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ build on the acquired virtues, rather 
than displacing them. But for Pattison, a work seems to count as theologically fruitful simply by 
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virtue of introducing, via the first phase of interpretation, various humanly universal themes, such as 
death, birth, and bodily vulnerability, which can then be further specified in theological terms. The 
theological appropriateness of the work depends, therefore, on its capacity to lead us into 
conventional theological themes, via a set of associations that are elicited in the first instance 
through ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƉƌĞ-theoretical, pre-ĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?sŝŽůĂ ?Ɛ
installation discloses the primal significance of water in human life, and thereby lends itself to 
theological appropriation, since theological perspectives on the import of water can be grafted onto 
this pre-discursive apprehension of its role in a ŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ?^ŽǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŽŶWĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?
the introduction of a theological frame does not point to a new set of aesthetic values, but simply 
enables the further specification of various theologically suggestive themes that are evoked in our 
initial, aesthetically informed encounter with the artwork. 
By contrast, on the view we have been developing, the introduction of a theological frame informs 
ŽƵƌĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚǁŽƌŬŝŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƚĞƌŵƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨŽƚƚŝĐĞůůŝ ?ƐĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?
we can find a new beauty in the figure of Mary once we locate her bodily demeanour within the 
relevant theological context. So we could rĞŐŝƐƚĞƌƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶWĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚ
the Thomistically informed perspective that we have been developing here by saying that on the first 
account, aesthetic values, of the kind that are evident from a secular vantage point, serve as a route 
into theological themes, whereas on the second account, theological themes serve as a route into 
aesthetic values which are theologically grounded and therefore invisible from a secular vantage 
point. 
In these ways, these three approaches yield different prescriptions about how we are to interpret 
the spiritual import of a work of art. Think, for instance, of any traditional representation of the 
ĂŶŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂǇ ?&ƌĂ&ŝůŝƉƉŽ>ŝƉƉŝ ?ƐĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĂŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ĂůůĞƌǇŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?21 If we 
read thŝƐŝŵĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƚǇůĞŽĨĞŐďŝĞ ?ƚŚĞŶǁĞǁŝůůĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
gestures and demeanour and those we might associate with the historical Jesus. Perhaps we will 
take these gestures (her downward gaze and slightly stooped figure, for instance) to express a 
Christ-like humility, and to be beautiful for this reason. If we follow Pattison, we will attend first of 
all to the play of shapes and colours on the canvass, and in general to the purely formal properties of 
the painting, in abstraction from any theological context, before using theological categories to 
elaborate upon various themes that are suggested by the ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ bodily impact.22 By contrast, on the 
                                                          
21 See https://www.nationalgalleryimages.co.uk/imagedetails.aspx?q=NG666&ng=NG666&frm=1, accessed 28 
January 2017. 
22 ŽŵƉĂƌĞWĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĂŝŐŝĞŝƚĐŚŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƌƵĐŝĨŝǆŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƚƐŽǀĞƌƚůǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ
matter, he seeks to read the picture in the first instance independently of any theological frame: Art, 
Modernity and Faith, pp. 186-188. 
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approach we have been considering, there is a distinctive, theologically grounded kind of beauty in 
the inflexions of DĂƌǇ ?Ɛbody, where this distinctiveness reflects not the introduction of a novel 
measure of aesthetic value, but a different context, to which her gestures are gracefully attuned. 
Independently of that context, we could still see those gestures as beautiful, and perhaps as bearing 
a kind of moral significance, in so far as they connote humility. But on the account we have been 
developing here, we should say that it is only when we know the theological narrative within which 
Mary is acting, and know ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŐĞů ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶŐƌĂƐƉŝŶĨƵůůƚŚĞďĞĂƵƚǇŽĨ
these gestures, and see how they bear a certain gravity, and exhibit a certain grace, as responses to 
this particular theological context. 
5. Concluding thoughts 
We have been considering three accounts of the contribution of aesthetic goods to the spiritual life, 
with particular reference to the role of the body in realising spiritually significant aesthetic values. I 
have suggested that one of these perspectives in effect collapses aesthetic values into spiritual 
values: on this view, for certain purposes anyway, spiritual or theological measures of aesthetic 
excellence take the place of conventional aesthetic standards. On a second view, on the contrary, 
conventional aesthetic standards operate independently of theological considerations, whose role is 
to elaborate upon various themes that are introduced in aesthetic experience. Finally, we have 
considered a view that occupies a kind of middle ground between these two: on this further 
account, some aesthetic values are indeed relative to our choice of theological perspective, but this 
is not because aesthetic values have been absorbed into theological values, but because theological 
narratives can provide a further context within which familiar aesthetic values may be realised. 
According to this final approach, some aesthetic goods share the theologically grounded, hybrid 
character of the goods of the infused moral virtues as Aquinas represents them in his discussion of 
the well-lived spiritual life. This third approach has a special affinity, of course, with Aquinas ?s 
conception of grace as perfecting nature, in the epistemic and metaphysical as well as moral 
domains.23 But its general spirit is, I suggest, very much evident in other religious traditions  W for 
there too we find the idea that religious narratives are concerned not simply with other-worldly 
possibilities, but with a deepening of the kinds of significance that can attach to our dealings with 
the material world, in our everyday lives, here and now. 
I began this paper by suggesting that aesthetic values appear to be important for many forms of 
lived religion, given the wide interest of religious traditions in, for example, the arts and in the 
regulation of the disposition of the body in worship or devotion. Our findings corroborate this initial 
                                                          
23 ^ĞĞŚŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ P ‘ŐƌĂĐĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŶĂƚƵƌĞďƵƚƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƐŝƚ ? PST 1a. 8 ad. 2, Benziger translation. 
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assessment. The theologically grounded aesthetic goods that we have been examining are 
potentially pervasive, because they can, in principle, be realised whenever we adopt a particular 
bodily demeanour in our dealings with the everyday world, which is to say much of the time. And 
they concern a profound spiritual good, since they aƌŝƐĞŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐďŽĚŝůǇůŝĨĞŝƐƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ
aligned not simply with some localised state of affairs, but with a sacred or transcendent context. If 
all of this is so, then we have the beginnings of an account of why aesthetic values should be 
fundamental to the practice of lived religion.24 
                                                          
24 In this paper, I have concentrated on the contribution of bodily demeanour to the realisation of spiritually 
significant aesthetic goods. Elsewhere, I have argued that such goods can also be realised in our perception of 
ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇƐĞŶƐŽƌǇǁŽƌůĚ ?^ĞĞŵǇƉĂƉĞƌ ‘ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ'ŽŽĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞEĂƚƵƌĞŽĨZĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶ& ?
Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Ch. 6.  I am grateful 
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